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Chatting with the Lady in the Grocery Store
About Hernandez v. Robles,
the New York Same-Sex Marriage Case
John B. Mitchell1
Company was coming that evening and I’d gone to the grocery store with
a list of needed ingredients in hand. After a successful shop, I was standing
in line with my cart brimming over when I heard the clerk utter the most
feared words known in modern society, “The computers are down.” That’s
it. I was stuck; there was no turning back. This could take awhile. I was
beginning to scan the magazines on the rack to get a quick summary of the
celebrity gossip when the person ahead of me in line turned around and
said, “I thought that was you, Mr. Mitchell. How funny. Here we are in
another grocery line.”
She was a woman whose children had graduated from the same high
school as mine and with whom, in a grocery line such as this one, I’d twice
before been drawn into lengthy discussions about some Supreme Court
case.2 Not this time, I prayed. So we chatted about family and old friends
and that championship high school basketball team we all cheered for when
the kids were seniors. Anything but law—no law; no law! And then it
happened. She glanced at a newspaper she was holding and said, “Mr.
Mitchell, you teach at a law school, so maybe you could explain something
to me.” Oh, no. Not again I thought, and then I heard my voice saying,
“I’ll try.” “Well, I’m reading about this New York case where the majority
of the judges said that there was no right to same-sex marriage.3 Are you
familiar with that case?” I was, but considered lying, although that
probably would have done me no good; she would have just supplied the
facts and all, like a Socratic professor when you say you haven’t read the
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case. And so it began. “I’m no expert in the area, but I have read it. In
fact, I have a photocopy of the main opinion here in my pack.”
Good. Now, what I don’t understand is why marriage isn’t a very
important right. I know it’s not specifically mentioned in the Constitution,
but don’t we have constitutional rights that aren’t explicitly listed in the
Constitution, like abortion?
Yes, we do. Abortion is one,4 and there is also a constitutional right for
both married5 and unmarried adults6 to obtain contraceptives.
Well, it would seem that the right to marry is at least as basic as the right
to obtain the various means of preventing birth from sex.
It is. In fact, the Supreme Court found that marriage is a fundamental
constitutional aspect of “liberty” under the Due Process Clause when it
struck down laws barring interracial marriage.7 In other words, marriage is
a fundamental constitutional right.
So then the New York court started with the notion that marriage is a
fundamental constitutional right?
Not really. It defined the right in question as “same-sex marriage,”
instead of just marriage.8 After all, that was what it was dealing with, you
know, gay couples who—
Did it make any difference that the court defined the right involved as
“same-sex marriage” as opposed to just plain old “marriage”?
In fact, it did. The Court has a test for determining whether a right that is
not enumerated in the Constitution is, nevertheless, “fundamental.”9 The
Court has determined that for a right to be fundamental, the right must be so
“deeply-rooted in this nation’s history and traditions” and “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if
they were sacrificed.”10
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Like using condoms?
Well . . . oh, look at these magazines. You’d think that there were only
eight people in America: Brad, Angelina, Jennifer—
But, if that’s the test for finding a right to be fundamental, it was
obviously all over once the court defined the right in question as “same-sex
marriage,” rather than “marriage.”
Well, that’s what the plaintiffs were asking for—not traditional marriage,
but same-sex marriage.
No. I don’t agree. They were asking to get married to the person they
loved and with whom they wanted to share a life. That person happened to
be of the same sex. The whole question was whether same-sex couples have
a right to be included within the institution of marriage. To define the right
the plaintiffs were seeking as some variant of the institution of marriage,
sitting outside its umbrella, basically begs the question. Through the
phrase “same-sex marriage,” the right sought becomes related to, but
separated from, “real” marriage. It becomes “gay-rriage,” the right to be
“gay-rried.” It’s not marriage.11
Perhaps. Hey, is that Black Cherry Vanilla Diet Coke you have in your
cart? How is that? I was—
Yes. It’s quite tasty. But, Mr. Mitchell, I’m afraid I’ve lost sight of the
forest for the trees in this discussion of how to define the right in question. I
guess my real question should be whether it makes any difference whether a
particular right is termed fundamental or not.
Actually, it makes quite a difference. In this arena, it will determine the
“standard of review,” which in turn will likely determine the outcome.
Appellate courts, of which the United States Supreme Court is one, do not
review legal decisions in a vacuum, but rather assess the cases in front of
them using different standards of review. These standards of review reflect
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the nature of the subject matter being reviewed. The standards of review
federal courts employ when assessing the constitutionality of particular
pieces of legislation are characterized in terms of levels of scrutiny.
The key to case outcomes under either fundamental rights or equal
protection analysis is what level of “scrutiny” a court applies when
reviewing a particular statute. This concept of scrutiny refers to how
carefully the court will question the rationale underlying a piece of
legislation.12 Generally, the courts show great deference to the work of the
legislature and will require only minimal rationality or a rational basis13 for
the legislation to be held constitutional. Under this standard, if the judge
can imagine any justification, even if it seems completely misguided, the
law will not be found unconstitutional. There is, however, a much higher
level of scrutiny known as strict scrutiny.14 If this level of scrutiny is
applied, the judge will really dig into the statute and its purported rationale,
and only find the statute constitutional if the piece of legislation is narrowly
tailored15 to serve a compelling state interest.
Therefore, if a right is fundamental, the court will review any law which
unduly burdens that right under a strict scrutiny analysis. If a right is not
fundamental, the court will review the law through a minimum rationality
lens. Simple. The only real question is whether the particular right in
question is or is not a fundamental constitutional right.16 I should add that
classifications based on race are also subject to strict scrutiny review.17 But,
back to the main topic of fundamental rights—
Odd, this requiring a “deeply-rooted tradition” would not only seem to
be lacking in the interracial marriage case, it would seem equally difficult
to reconcile this requirement with the contraception cases and all of the
abortion cases where you said the court found a constitutional right. Oh
well, interesting, but back to my main point. I still don’t understand. I
know that there were these horrible laws that prohibited interracial
marriage and the Supreme Court struck them down.
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That’s right. The case you’re thinking about involved a white man and a
black woman. Note that this was a man and a woman so they fell within the
traditional notion of a married couple.
Did the Supreme Court make any mention of that?
No, they had no reason to; it was not the issue in front of them—they
were solely concerned with race.
But it seems that the fact that the case involved a man and a woman, as
opposed to two women, played no part in the Court’s thinking about their
right to marry.
I’m not a psychic, so I don’t know what the Justices were thinking, but
again, their opinion is only about racial discrimination.
Was the alleged fundamental right in that case the “right to marry” or
“the right of a white man to marry a black woman”?
The former.
It seems that, under the test for finding fundamental rights that you just
told me about, that case could have come out differently if the right was
defined in the latter way, as “the right to interracial marriage”?
Possibly, as to the “deeply-rooted” part. But, I’m not so sure that
denying fundamental right status to the right of a white man to marry a
black woman wouldn’t have run afoul of the “implicit in ordered liberty”
concept—you know, a right basic to being a citizen in a free democratic
society. I can’t imagine the Court upholding such a blatantly discriminatory
law, regardless of how it defined the right in question.
So, the right in question in that case was defined as just “plain old
marriage”? And if the right had been defined as just “plain old marriage”
in the New York case, might that have changed the outcome?
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Possibly. The rationales justifying the denial of the right would have
been examined under the strict scrutiny lens of being narrowly tailored to
meet a compelling need. Instead, the court only had to find a rational basis,
which means that the legislature could have found, might have believed,
could have intuited, further inferred, etc.”18
So, the upshot of the New York opinion was that it is not unconstitutional
to restrict the availability of marriage to a man and a woman?
Basically.
So, what about a thirty-year-old man marrying a thirteen-year-old girl?
That is a male and female pairing. I mean, in many countries girls are still
betrothed at such ages and even younger.
I seem to recall a famous rock ‘n’ roll singer/pianist who married his
thirteen-year-old cousin. It caused quite a stir, but it was legal then where
he lived. Do the thirty-year-old male and the thirteen-year-old girl have a
fundamental right to marry?
I would say that they could claim a fundamental right to marry. To
prohibit that union, the state would have to show compelling reasons why
the union should not be held constitutional and a narrowly tailored approach
to achieving such ends. Here, the state can meet that high burden by setting
minimum age requirements, reflecting society’s concern for the
vulnerability of those of such youth and concern for the lack of capacity of
most young people of that age to meaningfully consent to all that is
involved in the binding contract of marriage.
So can a father marry his daughter and an uncle marry his niece?
I think you can answer that as well as I can. The multiple societal
concerns motivating an incest taboo provide the state with an even more
“compelling need” to bar the union than in the case of your thirteen-yearold would-be bride.
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What about polygamy? Polygamy was practiced in stories in the Bible,
in various societies throughout history, and presently in this country. In
fact, when I see so many wonderful heterosexual women who are single,
and the paucity of men who are their equal, I sometimes wonder about the
wisdom of the practice.
Same as the others; there’s a fundamental right, but the state has a
compelling need to ban such unions. I’m certain there are serious problems
with permitting polygamy, but I admit to not being versed in them.
Although, I can imagine that the law would have to be pretty creative to
deal with some of the custody issues—like when the husband divorces one
of his six wives. Of course, a court might deal with polygamy like the New
York court dealt with same-sex marriage, requiring the marriage to be
between a man and a woman. And the right being sought here is “the right
for one man to have more than one wife.” I don’t know. When the issue of
polygamy has come before the Supreme Court, it has always been about
religion and arguments that polygamy was central to the Mormon belief
system.19
So, like all these variants on marriage between male and female, the New
York court could have defined the right in question as the right to marry,
rather than same-sex marriage, and still found that that institution could be
denied to same-sex couples.
I’m not quite following you.
Well, like you just said, just because a set of individuals are claiming the
right to join in union under the fundamental right to marry does not mean
that they will be permitted to do so. So long as the state can show narrowly
tailored means to achieve the compelling needs of the state, the sought after
union can be denied. Am I right?
I guess . . . .
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So, if New York had “compelling” reasons to deny same-sex applicants
the right to marry, it could have constitutionally done so. My guess, then, is
that the state had some pretty pathetic and crummy reasons and that’s why
the New York court played this shell game—sleight of hand trick—replacing
the fundamental right to “marriage,” which was the appropriate starting
point for its analysis and the real issue at stake, and replaced it with this
phony right to “same-sex marriage.” Am I right?
Well, it did have two reasons, both involving the welfare of children,20
which the court found satisfied the minimum rational basis standard.
The welfare of children, really?
rationales?

How touching.

What were these

Well, the overall idea is that marriage and its “attendant benefits” are
“inducements” to become married, and this inducement is more important
to provide to different-sex than same-sex couples for the purpose of
achieving two goals related to the welfare of children.21
Interesting. So what is the reasoning behind tying marriage and
different-sex couples together in order to achieve the first goal?
Well, here’s the court’s reasoning on this one. It centers on the premise
that we want children to grow up in stable home environments.22
Of course, but I don’t see what that has to—
Now, hold on. Let me finish; this one takes a few steps.
Okay, lead on.
As a biological reality, sex between two people of the same sex cannot
result in children. Both gay and lesbian couples must choose to have
children23—either by adoption, in vitro, insemination, or by using a
surrogate. Heterosexual sex, on the other hand, leads to children. In fact,
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recent scientific miracles aside, heterosexual sex is the overwhelming
source of babies on this planet.24 With me so far?
That’s kind of hard to dispute, but how does all this lead to—
Hold on; I’m getting to that. These heterosexual relationships are, in the
New York court’s words, “all too often casual or temporary”25—hardly the
environment of stability we’d choose for children should passion overcome
reason and birth control is dispensed with, or the pill or condom fails. We
want to encourage heterosexual couples to enter into a more stable form of
relationship, and marriage, with its attendant public commitment and the
only way to end it being in a court of law, is a significant deterrent to
walking away from the relationship.
Huh?
Because of the fact that only heterosexual couples can have children
without consciously choosing to do so, and because most children result
from heterosexual sex, it is rational—remember that we’re talking about a
rational basis standard26—to offer marriage and its attendant benefits as an
inducement exclusively to that heterosexual population. It is an inducement
to marry and, thus, will increase the possibility that children, wanted or
otherwise, will grow up in a far more stable environment than an ongoing
series of one or the other biological parents’ “casual and temporary”
relationships.
You’re kidding, right?
Absolutely not. That’s what the New York court said. And, I must
confess, it does have some common-sense appeal.
Really? First, if we’re talking about couples having children out of
wedlock, I realize that society has traditionally desired that the couple
marry, that the mother be made an “honest woman,” if only so that the
child not be stigmatized as a bastard. Today, there still exists societal and
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familial pressure to marry under these circumstances, even without the need
of a shotgun. For many others, depending on the nature of the relationship
and other circumstances, abortion may be the choice. While for others,
adoption or single parenting may be the choice. It’s hard for me to accept
that, in the current world, society can fairly decide which among these
choices should be incentivized as a matter of general policy. Also, even if
having the child and marrying was the preferred societal policy to be
encouraged, given the cultural story of the unwed mother, the only incentive
marriage need offer is legitimacy. For a heterosexual woman, the
sanctification of marriage is not a proper inducement. It is not like a car
dealer throwing in a tape deck, sun roof, and air conditioning with a
purchase of some vehicle. The state is giving nothing. As you said, Mr.
Mitchell, the woman has an absolute constitutional right to marry the
father.
Well, as a matter of a “rational basis” analysis, the court could still hold
that the legislature could reasonably conclude that, while the legitimacy of
marriage is a sufficient incentive for some, the “attendant benefits” will
move others to choose marriage, and that marriage is the choice society
wants the couple to make.
Oh, come on, Mr. Mitchell.
You can disagree, but it’s not irrational. And that’s the standard of
review. Anyway, I don’t think the New York court was focused on children
already born out of wedlock. It seemed primarily concerned with the
general policy of steering heterosexual relationships, with their potential for
procreation, into the structure of marriage so that a stable environment will
exist when the inevitability of pregnancy occurs.
All this seems far more about the issue of the availability of good sex
education—whether from family and/or schools—the proper use of
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contraceptives, or the availability of the morning-after pill than it does the
institution of marriage.
Well, as you know, no birth control is 100 percent effective. Anyway,
under rational basis review, the remedy chosen does not have to be
narrowly tailored; it does not have to be the least restrictive choice to deal
with the need.
Back to that standard again, please.
Of course.
So, is the idea that a man or a woman in a casual, temporary relationship
should have incentive from the state to marry a person he or she has never
considered as a life companion or soulmate simply because of the tax
benefits? How absurd! But you’re going to say that idiocy is beyond the
point because we’re talking rational basis here?
Correct.
Same with the fact that many heterosexual couples choose not to have
children, or are biologically incapable of having children, as a result of
disease or age while, at the same time, most children are born as a result of
their parents’ choice, and that, in fact, having children is probably the
primary reason most people decide to marry rather than just live together?
Right. Those are all good points, but they can’t carry the day under a
rational basis analysis. The legislature may be making a bad, wrong-headed
decision. Fine, vote them out of office. But as long as its decision is
rational, the courts will not interfere.
Under strict scrutiny, would all my points count?
Very likely . . . . Boy, they still haven’t fixed the computer. Anyway,
you see how few cashiers they have? They want you to use those auto-scan
machines. Have you ever used them?
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A few times.
Were they difficult to use?
Not once you get the hang of it. You know, Mr. Mitchell, as you can tell,
I keep coming back to that shell game that let the New York court find that
same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right based on that rational basis
standard.
Uh huh.
But, there’s something else—this idea of incentives. I think if you
separate marriage from the “attendant benefit,” it all falls apart.
What do you mean?
Well, as I said before, the right to marriage as an inducement to
heterosexual couples to marry is completely illusory. They already have a
fundamental constitutional right to marry, which the state can’t deny for an
instant. And giving that right to same-sex couples costs the state nothing.
Marriage itself is not a scarce resource, like tax benefits, nor does
providing it involve a choice of lesser evils, like giving immunity to a
criminal in order to get his testimony against an even bigger criminal.
Go on.
In fact, allowing same-sex couples to marry is not only costless, it is
positive. While the New York court is correct that gay couples can’t have
children by having sex, but must consciously choose to have children, that
doesn’t mean that we don’t care if that couple does not remain together to
raise the child in a loving, stable home. If that relationship falls apart, we
may still have emotionally scarred children and a possible need for costly
state resources for one or more of the family members. Raising children is
a joy, but it also puts a great deal of strain on any relationship, gay or
otherwise. The ties entailed in the commitment we call marriage, and the
public and legal impediments to severing those ties, tend to hold couples
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together during those inevitable hard times. I know it, and so do you Mr.
Mitchell. Gay families need those bonds in tough times as much as non-gay
couples—unless we have some sound basis for saying that gay people have
far greater moral fiber and commitment to duty and responsibility than do
straight people.27
I grant that there’s a lot of truth in what you’re saying.
So, as to the pure right to marry being both costless and beneficial, it is
irrational not to provide it to same-sex partners who desire it. Of course,
some may argue that if we allow gay people to marry, we will devalue
marriage for non-gay couples, thus, leading to fewer heterosexuals
marrying, which undermines the entire social policy of encouraging
heterosexuals to marry. You know, that may even happen; there are some
really narrow-minded, bigoted people in this large country. But it cannot
be the role of the state to determine the rights of one group because of the
decisions of another, which are based on their private moral beliefs and
biases.
What is your basis for that conclusion?
You’re the law professor, Mr. Mitchell. Aren’t there cases where one
person’s rights couldn’t be curtailed because of the reaction of others?
Well, in the First Amendment arena, a speaker’s message does not lose
constitutional protection merely because his or her message makes members
of the audience angry.28
And what about curtailing one group’s rights because of another’s moral
beliefs?
Well, the recent Supreme Court case striking down a Texas sodomy law,
which punished gay men for engaging in such conduct in the privacy of
their homes, really came down to the fact that the only reason supporting
the law was a moral stance against homosexuality.29
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Good. Thank you.
Sure. But let’s go back to the core of your idea, separating what you call
“pure marriage” from the so-called “attendant benefits.” You’re correct, the
benefits are the only “inducements” the state can offer or withhold.
Marriage, however, is a legal and contractual relationship—with some lust
and tender feelings thrown in—involving a bundle of rights and
responsibilities. If you give someone marriage, the bundle of rights is
inextricable from the union. The problem is that that bundle includes scarce
state resources, which it may rationally allocate one way or another to
achieve the ends of its policies. If you allow gay people to marry, they get
the bundle. In fact, access to the rights and benefits in that bundle is high
on the list of reasons gays and lesbians seek marriage,30 and the current
denial of those benefits to them and their families forms one of the most
powerful, moral, and equitable arguments in favor of same-sex marriage.
Perhaps, but that is a totally separate issue. Mr. Mitchell, could you
deny an attorney to an indigent criminal defendant charged with murder
because of the expense, or could you deny a controversial political
candidate the right to speak because security and crowd control would be
too expensive?
You could control the expenses the appointed attorney incurs31 and
reasonably regulate your political speaker as to the time, place, and
manner.32 But, no, you couldn’t absolutely deny the defendant an attorney
or absolutely bar the candidate from public speaking because of financial
costs to the state.
So, I gather that if a person has a right to marry, then the state cannot
deny that right simply because of the expense the reasonable exercise of
that right will cost the state.
Well, it seems—
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Of course, giving most of these marriage-inducing benefits is really the
choice of the state—they are not inherent in the very nature of marriage.
The state is free to calculate the total costs of each benefit and then decide
whether continuing to offer the particular benefit is worth the cost.
Fine. That’s very thought provoking. But, you’ve just undercut your own
argument.
How?
If gays and lesbians are allowed to marry, the state will have to give these
couples benefits, which generally means allocating scarce public resources
in a way that the state would otherwise not have to. So, we’re really back to
the New York court’s rationale about targeting “inducement” to differentsex couples.
So, what is the state’s rationale for not letting same-sex couples marry
and essentially denying them benefits?
Wait a minute. You’re becoming a regular sophist. You’ve just been
arguing that you cannot deny a right solely based on cost, although I never
got the chance to mention that your two examples, the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel and the First Amendment right to free speech, are
constitutional rights explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. So if samesex marriage were a constitutional right, then economic costs could not be
determinative in deciding whether to recognize that right. But to assume
that it’s a right begs the entire question we’re discussing as to whether
same-sex couples have a right to marry.
No, Mr. Mitchell, the New York court is using dollar costs as the basis for
determining whether the right exists in the first place.
Well—
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Anyway, even if we were to assume that we are not dealing with a
fundamental constitutional right, how can New York deny the status of
marriage to same-sex couples, benefits aside?
But, benefits are not aside.
Why not? The New York court’s rationale for letting different-sex, but
not same-sex, couples marry was tied to efficient use of “inducements.”
Now we’ve agreed that marriage itself is not an inducement for
heterosexual couples because it’s their fundamental constitutional right.
So gay couples can get married, but are denied the benefits heterosexual
couples receive as an entitlement?
Yes.
That would be blatant discrimination based solely on homosexuality.
That would be naked prejudice!
I agree, but I think that the bottom line of the New York case is based on
prejudice.33 My question, however, is that using the New York court’s
stated rationale, why couldn’t the court permit same-sex marriage, but deny
benefits on exactly the same grounds the court used to deny marriage in the
first place—that it is rational to provide inducements solely to different-sex
couples?
While the state might be able to do that under a rational basis analysis,
the court could find that the legislature could reasonably believe that to
allow gay people to marry while denying them equivalent benefits, although
legal, would provoke anger and social alienation in certain segments of our
population.
What segments? Do you mean gay people?
Yes, and perhaps even among non-gay activists. And though this
constituency may already be angered by the New York decision, it is
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reasonable to believe that it will not be to the same magnitude as that which
would follow your “marriage without benefits” proposal. You may not
agree, but this analysis is hardly irrational. Again, all of this is very
interesting. I notice you are buying veggie burgers. Have you stopped
eating meat? I’ve begun to notice that many of my friends—
No, I like meat. They are for my cousin, who is visiting with her family.
Anyway, you said the New York court had two goals relating to child
welfare, which it sought to achieve by tying the right to marry exclusively to
heterosexual couples. What is the second?
Are you sure you want to hear? Hey, your cousin, that isn’t by any
chance—
Absolutely, I want to hear about the second goal.
Okay. Here goes. And remember, this is rational basis.
So, this one must be really idiotic. Go ahead.
Let me get that photocopy out of my pack. I think it would be best for
me to quote the New York court. Here goes: “the Legislature could
rationally believe that it is better, other things being equal, for children to
grow up with both a mother and a father. Intuition and experience suggest
that a child benefits from having before his or her eyes, every day, living
models of what both a man and woman are like.”34
Hmm . . . okay. I know this rational basis game by now. So, it makes no
difference that a staggering percentage of these mommy-daddy families end
in divorce?
No. No difference at all.
Or that living models of what both a man and a woman are like could be
furnished by other relatives, friends, and co-workers, likely even better than
a parent that is consistently away at work or, god forbid, abusive? Can you
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imagine anything more harmful to children than growing up watching their
father beat their mother, or themselves being the victims of abuse by these
traditional parents?
Again, you’re right; under rational basis, none of that matters. Good
point, but none of it makes the legislative grounds irrational. Also, even on
your own terms, exposure to relatives and friends does not model what a
man and a woman are like in a day-to-day committed and sexual
relationship.
I agree. But to model how to interact in a committed, sexual relationship
you don’t need a man and a woman; a same-sex couple will do. That’s
probably why, in the quote, the court did not refer to children seeing a
heterosexual relationship, but rather just gave those two gender examples
of man and woman, Adam and Eve. Not to mention the notion of the malefemale parent preference is nonsense given the reality of marriage and
divorce in our current society, but I’ll accept it for the sake of argument.
Perhaps, but where’s the irrationality?
You know, I think that by not taking the fundamental right to marriage as
the starting point for its reasoning, what the New York court did was a total
con. But even within this rational basis stuff, it’s irrational.
How?
Well, let me ask you this. Do we bar gay couples from having their own
children—by in-vitro, insemination, using a surrogate, or the next scientific
miracle?
No, of course not.
Are gay couples forbidden to adopt?
Well, at one time there were issues; now gay couples may adopt in most
states without a problem, though still not all.
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Now these kids who have gay couples as parents, by definition, will not
have the mother-father models the New York court believed the legislature
could rationally find more desirable than same-sex parents, right?
That’s correct.
So, if you’re going to let gay couples be parents, how does denying
marriage to these gay parents have any bearing, whatsoever, on whether or
not children will have a male and female parent?
That’s a fair question.
Thanks, can you give me a fair answer?
I’ll try. Let me begin with the reasonable assumption that more gay
couples would have children, whether through adoption or biological
means, if they were formally married. I’m not guessing at how many more,
but it seems that the permanence and societal recognition of that marital
status naturally engenders thoughts of family. After all, from my limited
experience, the adult gay couples I’ve known have been pretty
mainstream—lawns, barbecues, soccer games, and piano lessons—when
they have kids of their own. I have no reason to believe that marriage
would do anything but bind most gay couples even further into the nuclear
family narrative. Am I being fair?
Please, go on.
Now, the resources gay couples require to have children are quite finite:
babies and children available for adoption, male and female genetic material
required for procreation, and willing surrogates. The problem is that nongay couples who, for a range of reasons, are incapable of having their own
children, will vie for these same limited resources. At some point, gay
married couples—who well might equal or exceed the number of
heterosexual married couples who biologically cannot have their own
children—will take resources away from heterosexual married couples who
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need them in order to have children. As a result, children who would have
been raised in the preferred male-female parenting environment will be
raised by gay married couples, while some number of heterosexual married
couples who cannot have their own children will be left out in the cold for
lack of available adoptive and genetic resources.
You’re serious? I know, I know, rational basis.
Correct, again.
What I’m gathering is that, in effect, you’re asking me to accept that
unless the legislation reflects the demented, incoherent ravings of a mad
man, the court will find it to have a rational basis.
Well, I wouldn’t put it quite that way.
Nor would I, Mr. Mitchell. You’ve made a clever argument, and it
certainly is rational, in that it’s coherent, well-articulated, one premise tied
to the next, hardly the delusional babbling of the demented—
Thank you, I’m flattered.
But, what you’ve said is also baseless, created from thin air, without the
slightest concern about any connection to reality.
Well, I don’t think—
You’ve made up a sperm and egg shortage. Why would that be? Aren’t
these bits of genetic material constantly being regenerated in billions upon
billions of human bodies all over the planet?
But there are transaction costs to collection, screening, and storing.
Anyway, people don’t want just any genetic material; the biological donor’s
health, intelligence, and yes, race, matter.
So you’re saying that a gay couple might take the more desirable genetic
material leaving the non-gay married couple with a less desirable choice?
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Precisely.
But, the New York court didn’t say that heterosexual married couples
should be the only ones to raise the most genetically desirable children. It
actually said that the male-female parenting is most desirable for raising
whatever children there are. So unless the only genetic material left for
non-gay couples in your fantasy is of such poor prospects that no
reasonable couple would use it, the number of children raised by non-gay
married couples would not be less because gay people may marry.
Still, you have to consider—
Wait a minute. Before we continue this discussion about insemination,
let’s get back to reality. These types of arguments are totally make-believe,
and the gay couples, who love each other every bit as much as I love my
husband and you love your wife, have their lives affected by this makebelieve. Even in your fantasy, how many heterosexual couples who could
not have their own children would be denied access to the resources for
having children if same-sex partners could marry? If one non-gay couple
could not obtain the resources for a child, would that justify denying gay
marriage within your conjecture? How about ten? What is your criteria for
even making the decision that prevents adults who love each other from
formally binding their lives together? I can’t begin to imagine, nor do I
believe, could you.
You’re right; we are getting a bit esoteric here.
Not esoteric at all, Mr. Mitchell. Underlying all of this is the message
that we don’t like the idea of gay couples raising kids because it’s not
normal. We fear that kids will “catch” gayness35 from their parents and
that their parents may even molest them because they are perverts, after all.
Now wait a minute. I don’t read that into the court’s opinion and it’s not
how anyone I know feels. Our society does let gay couples raise kids. The
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issue is marriage and whether same-sex couples are constitutionally entitled
to that status. The New York case is not some anti-gay polemic. Forgive
me, but I just don’t think that that kind of rhetoric helps deal with an issue
admittedly so sensitive to many.
Very well. I’m sorry if I offended you.
No such thing. Well, this has been quite a discussion.
Earlier you mentioned a Supreme Court case that said that it was
unconstitutional to forbid blacks and whites to marry.
Yes.
Tell me about that case.
Not much to tell really. Virginia had an anti-miscegenation law making
it a felony for any white person to marry a nonwhite person. Mr. Loving
was white and his wife was black, and, as a result, they were both convicted
of a felony.36 The Supreme Court found that the Virginia law violated the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the
fundamental right to marry.37 The Court used a strict scrutiny analysis38 and
found that the state had no compelling rationale for the law.39 In this
regard, the Court held that the state’s rationale of maintaining “racial
integrity”40 was not a compelling interest of the state to be protected.
It seems like that case is pretty much the same as the gay marriage case.
Not at all. While there may be superficial similarities, there are
fundamental differences. First, the case involved a criminal statute. It was
a felony for simply marrying.
That’s certainly terrible, but you’re not saying that if the Virginia law
was a civil law, like New York’s no gay marriage law, that it would be
constitutional today because it was not a criminal law?
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No, of course not. But the Virginia case also dealt with the core reason
for the very existence of the Fourteenth Amendment—racial
discrimination.41
So the Fourteenth Amendment has only been used to address racial
discrimination?
No. It’s been applied to unequal treatment based on gender42 and
nationality.43 But stop before you go there. We won’t let legislatures
arbitrarily discriminate based on sexual orientation, but sexual orientation is
not a highly protected class like race and gender, and, thus, the rational
basis standard is used rather than the higher level of scrutiny used for the
other protected classes.44
What makes these groups a protected class? Why do gay people belong
to a class no more protected than, say, dog owners?
It’s a bit complex, but basically comes down to a mix of factors including
a history of discrimination, exclusion from the political process,45 and
harmful stereotypes influencing legislative decisions.46 Of course, the
plaintiffs in the New York case cited the Supreme Court opinion finding the
Virginia anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional, but the New York court
rightly differentiated gays from blacks by pointing out the terrible
discrimination blacks have suffered, the omnipresence of racism, and the
whole civil rights movement to gain equality.47 Blacks were entitled to be
considered a protected class given that, in light of a long history of
discrimination, any race-based legislation was highly suspect. Gay people
simply do not present a comparable story.
Access to the political process? Until very recently in our history, the
notion of gay people openly acknowledging their gayness to the point of
organizing into a viable, recognizable, political constituency capable of
influencing votes on issues and electing candidates is a bit far fetched, to
say the least. As for “harmful stereotype,” doesn’t flouncing and mincing
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pervert, child molester—after all, that’s what the Catholic Church said
about the molestation scandal, that the problem was homosexuals in the
clergy48—and now, carrier of AIDS as a punishment from God for their
immorality, constitute sufficiently “harmful stereotypes”?
Have you ever thought of entering the legal profession? You might have
been able to convince the New York court.
And discrimination? I’m not saying it’s the same discrimination as
blacks experienced because, after all, most blacks couldn’t hide their race,
or pass as white. Gay people, on the other hand, not only could hide who
they really were, society actually forced them to do so.49 We so repressed
their identity that the phenomenon is metaphorically referred to as being
“in the closet,” a small, dark, cramped space totally separated from the
light and life of the home. When they did “come out” into the broader
community, they risked being beaten, taunted, denied, fired from their jobs,
harassed, and even murdered. They were called fairies, faggots, dykes, and
lesbos—the antithesis of real men and women. To tell a boy that he acted,
behaved, or threw a ball “like a fag” was the ultimate degradation of his
being. Not long ago, gay people were encouraged to undergo shock
therapy treatment50 to become normal, and so great was society’s
intolerance that many gay people sought and embraced such frighteningly
desperate means to attain that elusive “normalcy.” In fact, less than
twenty-five years ago, the American Psychiatric Association classified
homosexuality as a psychopathology.51 I think gay people can make their
case for a history of relentless, merciless, societal discrimination which
continues right up to the very present. Just ask any gay person who, while
risking his or her life in the military, must still hide who he or she is.
Hey, I’m just the messenger; I’m just giving you the New York court’s
reasoning. I appreciate what you’ve just—

RIGHT TO MARRY

Hernandez v. Robles 279

And, I think there’s even more in that Supreme Court case that bears on
this. In this newspaper article it says that the New York court said the law
limiting marriage to a man and woman treated all genders equally because
women couldn’t marry women and men couldn’t marry men.52 But, from
what you said, the fact that the Virginia law treated both whites and
nonwhites the same, that both were guilty of a crime, made no difference to
the Supreme Court.53
That’s because race, a suspect classification, was involved. In the New
York case, the court was merely pointing out that the only potential
protected class on the radar, gender, was not involved. Sexual orientation
was, but that’s not a protected class meriting heightened scrutiny.
What? This is all about gender, just like the Virginia case in which the
only reason whites and nonwhites were forbidden to marry was their race.
In the New York case, gender is the sole determinant. A man who loves
another man is forbidden to marry that man solely because of the first
man’s gender. A woman who wants to marry another person she loves is
forbidden to marry the object of her love solely because of that first
woman’s gender. This is all about gender.
Well, that’s one way to look at it.
Also, at its core, this is pure, unadulterated, gender stereotyping at play;
a women dreams of her Prince Charming, a man of his fairy-tale princess.
The woman should not dream of bedding the princess, and the man the
prince. This law discriminates against women who will just not act like
women and men who will not behave as our stereotypical man. And one
more thing—
Only one?
What weight can this professed preference for male-female parenting
have when the Supreme Court gave no credence to arguments that children
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of interracial marriages would suffer and be harmed by their mixed
heritage?
I don’t recall the Court even mentioning any rationale like that for the
Virginia law.
But, you’re aware of that argument against interracial marriage?
Certainly, but again, it was not an idea raised by the Supreme Court. Oh,
great, the computers are up! Now this line will finally move. Oh, my God,
that man’s grocery bag broke. What a mess. I should have brought my
dinner; we’re going to be in this line forever.
Poor man. I hope he knows to check those eggs now. Good, they’ve got
two young clerks to the rescue, and the line is moving again. Almost there,
Mr. Mitchell. Anyway, don’t you see what this gay marriage case is
ultimately all about?
No. But, I’m certain you’ll tell me.
The New York court does not comprehend the harm to gay couples, and
their children, from denying them the status of marriage because the court
simply cannot see the relationship of two men or two women who wish to
marry to be “as real” as that between a man and a woman. The court
cannot find comparability between the two relationships. No doubt, some
find the image of two men holding hands, kissing after reciting their vows,
as disgusting and offensive, just as was (and no doubt remains) the reaction
of some people to interracial couples marrying. Some will also see the
marriage of two men or two women as a parody or mockery of real
marriage. Heterosexual marriage is real; gay marriage is not. To face the
equivalence of the two would surely be as significant a blow to
“heterosexual superiority” as striking down the Virginia statute was to
“white supremacy.”
Hmmm . . . .
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What about that recent Texas sodomy case you told me about? Did the
New York plaintiffs tell the court about that case?
Of course. The New York court said that that case meant that gay people
could have full, meaningful, and sexual relationships, and that the state
could not impose its moral orthodoxy into the privacy of their homes.54
But, the New York case was totally different; marriage is public and state
sanctioned, and the denial of that status carried no such harm to gay people
in New York, as did the criminal statute struck down by the Supreme Court
in Texas.55
Again, right below the surface of opinions, like this New York case, is the
notion that gay relationships cannot be considered “real” in the same sense
as heterosexual ones. In effect, the New York court was saying, “do what
you do in the privacy of your home, just don’t flaunt it in public. Don’t ask,
don’t tell. Follow these guidelines and we’ll have no trouble. We’ll accept
your gayness as your unfortunate burden and allow you to do whatever you
do with each other in the privacy of your home. Think of this as our
accommodation to your psychological disability, you know, like the
Americans with Disabilities Act.”
Now, that’s not fair.
I think it is. I’m not gay, nor are any of my closest friends. My children
are not gay. I admit I am thankful for that because of all the pain that
would await them—although, life seems to have enough pain for us all. But
if one of them was, and found that special person and wanted to get
married, it would be hard for me to conceive that their marriage would, in
any way, differ from or be any less “real” than that of my daughter to my
son-in-law, so long as it was “for better or for worse, in sickness and in
health, for richer or poorer, until death do you part.” That’s marriage, not
the gender of the plastic figures on the wedding cake. That’s why I would
imagine that a “civil union,” replete with all the “additional benefits”
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accompanying marriage, though no doubt far, far better than the existing
situation for gay couples, would still not fulfill the needs of many gay
couples. They want their union publicly acknowledged to be as real as that
of heterosexuals, and they want it proclaimed from the top of the church,
temple, mosque, or city hall that they do not live in a society of
“heterosexual superiority,” which relegates them to second-class
citizenship.
Yet, marriage between a man and a woman is not a radical, new idea.
It’s not easy to get the image of Adam and Eve out of people’s minds, you
know.
Adam and Eve? Now, Mr. Mitchell, you aren’t suggesting that an
American court can base its decision upon the beliefs of a particular
religion?
No, of course not. In our pluralistic society, religious beliefs are the
province of each individual; they are not the proper basis for a court’s
action.56
Good, I thought so. Oh, I’m almost at the head of the line, but I’d like to
say something about Adam and Eve and the Book of Genesis.
Sure, go ahead.
Now, I know that the various versions of the Bible can differ somewhat,
but I’ve looked at a few and, with regard to this part, they’re pretty much
the same. God looks at Adam and thinks that it’s not good for man to be
alone. Adam was brought into the garden of Eden to “till and tend it” and
God decided to “make a fitting helper for him.”57 Not a lover, not a
soulmate, but a “helper.” So, God then created all the wild beasts and
birds—obviously, fish would be little help tilling and tending a garden—and
he brought them in front of Adam to see what he would name each. Adam
named each, but “for Adam no fitting helper was found.”58 Only then does
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God create woman out of Adam’s rib, truly, a last resort for a helper.
Adam accepts Eve as his helper59 and the rest as they say—
Interesting, but I’m not sure I get the point.
It was not necessary that man’s sole companion be a woman. If Adam
had been more practical or creative, he would have chosen a horse, donkey,
or elephant as a helper in tilling and tending the land. If he were ten years
old, he would have chosen a puppy. Oops, I’ve got to put my groceries on
the belt. Nice talking to you, Mr. Mitchell. Give my best to your family.
Same to you.
Then it was my turn to place my groceries on the belt, and by the time I
was done, she was gone. Could she have been right? Was it possible that
all of the New York court’s carefully crafted legal arguments were no more
than baseless pretenses masking raw, visceral prejudice? And then I heard
the words heralding the end of my long journey through the grocery line—
“paper or plastic?”
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